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ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS






Among the materials recorded in the main hall of the Holocaust memorial
at Yad Vashem in Israel are the words of the great eighteenth century founder
of modern Hasidism, Bal Shem Tov: “Forgetting lengthens the period of exile!
In remembrance lies the secret of deliverance.”1  As the founders of Yad
Vashem knew, remembrance is vital if bloody crimes like the Holocaust are to
be addressed and their repetition prevented.  This insight is critical as both suc-
cessor regimes and the international community turn to consideration of the
question of impunity.  Heinous violations of human rights should never go un-
remarked.  Their extent should be catalogued, their details exposed, and their
causes explored.  If carnage is ignored or forgotten, peace and justice are seri-
ously jeopardized.  It is only when misconduct is exposed and addressed that
the law can begin to build a fence around it.  The extension of the rule of law is
premised upon the disclosure of misdeeds and societal response to that disclo-
sure.2
How the national and world communities should approach egregious viola-
tions of human rights is a complex question.  The classic response has been
criminal prosecution.  In the modern era, this choice is perhaps best exempli-
fied by the trials conducted at Nuremberg after the fall of Hitler’s Reich.
These proceedings were conducted in a manner that was intended to prosecute
and memorialize at the same time—to punish Nazi leaders while disclosing in a
powerful documentary record the immensity of the Nazi regime’s crimes.3  The
idea of using a criminal trial for these two purposes has been an attractive one.
It has appealed to a number of nations struggling to address the crimes of the
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past and create a lasting record regarding them.  It was the model adopted by
the State of Israel in dealing with Adolf Eichmann and the Holocaust.4  More
recently, it appears to have been the model adopted by the United Nations to
address the horrors of Bosnia5 and Rwanda.6
The trial process, however, is not the only way to confront heinous human
rights violations.  At least since the fall of the military regime in Argentina,7
some nations have employed an alternative approach, sometimes in addition to,
and sometimes as an alternative to, criminal prosecution.  This approach has
often been described as the “truth commission” method.  It has been used at
least nineteen times over the past twenty-one years,8 and has played a part in
such diverse settings as Uruguay, Germany, Chad, and South Africa.9  The
truth commission does not prosecute but rather devotes its energies to assem-
bling a full record concerning prior misdeeds.  It seeks to describe what hap-
pened, who was responsible,10 and what motives were at work.  Once all this has
been done, the results are published so that society will have a lasting record
and, perhaps, a guide to avoid future infringement of human rights.
While truth commissions need not function as an alternative to prosecution,
they have so operated in a large number of cases.11  In such circumstances, they
have been treated as the appropriate and exclusive response to the crimes of a
prior regime.  The recent South African example is perhaps the most powerful
in this regard.  There the truth commission was authorized to grant immunity
from prosecution to those who would provide complete and accurate testimony
about misdeeds carried out during apartheid.12
In light of the rapid expansion of the use of truth commissions, it seems ap-
propriate to consider whether, and to what extent, commission proceedings
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may satisfy national and international expectations that serious human rights
violations will be addressed by a successor regime.  What follows seeks to as-
sess this question while keeping in mind the broader problem of impunity.
II
SUCCESSOR REGIME RESPONSES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF A
PREDECESSOR
In recent years, triumphant democratic reformers in a number of countries
around the world have had to face the difficult question of what steps to take in
dealing with the human rights violations of predecessor regimes.  While there is
ample reason to conclude that the best response to such violations is, most of-
ten, the vigorous prosecution of perpetrators, this article will suggest that there
may be situations in which, for practical reasons or on the basis of sound policy,
prosecution is inappropriate and an alternative relying on the inquiry of a truth
commission is acceptable.  In succeeding sections, it will be argued, first, that
prosecution is usually best, but, second, that if certain conditions have been
met, the choice to rely instead on a truth commission may be a valid one.  Third
it will be argued that several categories of human rights violations should never
be left to the exclusive assessment of a truth commission, and, finally, that with
respect to violations that should not go unprosecuted, there is a need for an in-
ternational tribunal, if, in a reasonably limited time frame, a successor regime
has not prosecuted on its own.
A.  The Benefits of Prosecution
Prosecuting the human rights violations of a predecessor regime can yield at
least half a dozen significant benefits to a democratic government.13 First, it can
substantially enhance the prospects for the establishment of the rule of law.
Holding violators accountable for their misdeeds signals all members of society
that the law’s authority is superior to that of individuals.  Such a signal is of
immense value in building a lasting tradition of respect for and adherence to
the law, and has been identified by some commentators as the key to the devel-
opment of truly democratic institutions.14
Second, prosecution can function as a means of educating the citizenry to
the nature and extent of prior wrongdoing.  Such education may serve both to
inoculate the populace against lapses into oppressive behavior and as a means
of establishing an accurate account of what actually transpired before the
democratic regime came to power.15  An accurate record can also serve as a
powerful deterrent to later revisionism.
Third, prosecution is one of the most effective ways of identifying and cre-
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ating the predicate for the compensation of victims of a predecessor regime’s
misdeeds.  Prosecution will, by its nature, lead to the disclosure of the identity
of victims, the nature of their injuries, and the persons responsible for those
injuries.  Such a presentation not only establishes a record upon which compen-
sation may be awarded, but fixes a moral basis for such action.  Prosecution, in
this context, serves both the public’s and the victim’s interest in compensation.
It addresses the informational needs of both and puts in their hands the tools
that can help them secure needed relief.
Fourth, prosecution can provide a means of punishing wrongdoers for their
criminal conduct.  It makes possible the sort of retribution seen by most socie-
ties as an appropriate communal response to criminal conduct.  It may also sat-
isfy victims’ desires for vengeance.  Moreover, punishment serves to stigmatize
malefactors and facilitate their isolation from the society that suffered because
of their actions.
Fifth, prosecution can enhance a society’s ability to deter future violations
of human rights.  If potential wrongdoers believe that they are likely to face
punishment for their misdeeds, they may be persuaded not to initiate such ac-
tivity.
Finally, prosecution may be essential to healing the social wounds caused by
serious human rights violations.  It has been argued that society cannot forgive
what it cannot punish.  If that argument is correct, the first real step to restoring
social harmony comes with prosecution.
B.  Practical Reasons to Forgo Prosecution
Despite the strength of the arguments in favor of prosecution, a great num-
ber of budding democracies from Latin America to Southern Africa and from
Eastern Europe to South Asia have rejected prosecution in favor of one or an-
other form of public inquiry.  It appears that their decisions to forgo prosecu-
tion, have, at least in part, been motivated by the most compelling of practical
considerations.
Many fledgling democracies have simply not had the power, popular sup-
port, legal tools, or conditions necessary to prosecute effectively.  In some
cases, governments have simply been too weak to pursue powerful defendants.
Often such defendants are an integral part of an intact military establishment
fully capable of bringing down the government if too directly threatened.16  The
choice to prosecute in such cases may mean the demise of democracy rather
than the punishment of human rights violators.
In other cases, governments have found themselves lacking a popular man-
date to pursue defendants.  This has often been the situation in countries that
have participated in a brokered ending to a civil war.  Defendants in such situa-
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tions may be drawn from both sides in such numbers or at such high levels as to
provoke the citizenry or the former combatants to resist prosecution, thereby
unraveling a painstakingly arranged peace.  Alternatively, the very basis for the
end of hostilities may have been the reconciliation of all combatants and their
full reintegration into society.  Prosecution may mean the destruction of a frag-
ile compromise.17
Still other new democracies have found their adjudicatory mechanisms too
weak, unskilled, biased, or corrupt to carry out the difficult task of overseeing
fair and expeditious trials.  The lack of an adequate judiciary, or the interposi-
tion of a suspect military justice system, may taint prosecutions that do go for-
ward or delay prosecutions for such extended periods as to undermine their
credibility or popular support.  In such cases, the judicial mechanism itself
needs to be fixed, and reliance on the tainted institution will serve only to com-
promise the integrity of the new regime.18
In practical terms, opting for a broad factual inquiry may be the best means
of encouraging stability and avoiding the uncertainties that criminal prosecu-
tions create.  It is no secret that uncertainty invites turmoil, a risk that a society,
with good reason, may wish to avoid.  Fact-gathering without prosecution may
speed the healing process while inconclusive prosecutions may drag on for
years allowing doubts and disputes to fester.  Inflated expectations, raised by a
series of high profile prosecutions may, if disappointed, produce a serious
backlash against democratic institutions.
Moreover, prosecutions raise a number of fairness issues themselves.  The
difficult problems of adjudicator competence and bias were canvassed above.
Other issues arise as well.  Closely linked to adjudicator bias is the charge that
prosecutions are nothing more than “victors’ justice,” a settling of scores by
those who have won the contest.  This sort of prosecution sets the stage for re-
vanchism rather than democracy and casts doubt upon the wisdom of proceed-
ing, at least in some cases.
Prosecution also raises a very difficult set of questions concerning the selec-
tion of defendants.  It is likely to be impossible to prosecute all human rights
violations.  Therefore, some subset of possible cases will have to be selected.
That subset may include a few powerful defendants and/or a group of malefac-
tors whose deeds are particularly visible or egregious.  If only the highest
echelons are prosecuted, it is possible that those further down the ladder will
conclude that they are free to act as they choose so long as they avoid becoming
too prominent.  If only defendants connected with especially terrible acts are
selected for prosecution, it is possible that they will be perceived as scapegoats
for a much larger body of defendants, including those in highest authority.19
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This analysis should not be understood as suggesting that the problem of selec-
tion makes prosecution impossible, but rather that a society might reasonably
conclude that in the context of its experience, there may be good reason to
avoid the problems posed by the inevitable selectivity of prosecution.
Governments have been prevented from prosecuting not only by serious in-
ternal problems, but by external threats, as well.  Of course, when a new de-
mocracy is fighting for its life in a military conflict with an external foe, there
may be reason to forgo prosecutions that could substantially weaken the effec-
tiveness of the country’s defenders.  The same may be true if a disastrous eco-
nomic situation has brought the country to its knees and threatened the exis-
tence of democratic institutions.  In such emergencies, prosecution may be
destructive of the fabric of society.20
Practical problems of a wholly different sort may raise serious questions
about the efficacy of prosecution.  The attitudes of the populace and even their
representatives may be so intensely hostile as to render a fair trial impossible.
Prosecutions must be, and must be perceived to be, fair in order to be useful to
a society.  When the tide of popular feeling runs too high to allow for fairness,
wisdom may counsel against proceeding.  Bloody “show trials” undertaken in
haste and resulting in draconian punishment will not yield the benefits de-
scribed in the preceding section of this paper.21  It is best to avoid trials that
make a mockery of justice or set a provocative example that will fuel revanchist
reaction.
Finally, the misdeeds of a predecessor may be so extensive or difficult to
document as to make the independent gathering of information about them
impossible.  In these circumstances, it may be necessary, if society is to uncover
the whole truth, to provide incentives to potential defendants to tell what they
know.  Such incentives may include immunity from prosecution.  Sometimes,
societies may find it appropriate to barter prosecution for full disclosure.22
C.  Policy Reasons to Forgo Prosecution
Separate and apart from practical concerns, there are a number of policies
that might justify forgoing prosecution and substituting the inquiry of a truth
commission.  First, it may be the overwhelming majority’s view that prosecu-
tions will not serve the best interests of society.  When this conclusion is ex-
pressed at the ballot box, either through a plebiscite or the election of represen-
tatives who have campaigned on such a platform, it is questionable whether a
democratic government can ignore popular political sentiment.23  The very es-
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sence of a democracy is that it openly discusses and decides such monumental
questions as the nature of justice and the proper course to be pursued by gov-
ernment.  If the populace has freely and fairly chosen a path that leads away
from prosecution, outsiders should be very cautious about condemning that
choice.  This is not to say that every criminal case ought to be put to a vote, but
rather that when a transformative event occurs in a society, the majority of its
members ought to have a critically influential voice in deciding the new direc-
tion to be taken.
What substantive policies might motivate a society to choose to avoid zeal-
ous prosecution is not a huge mystery.  Many of the great religions of the world
have concluded that “an eye for an eye” is a sterile sort of justice that is far less
satisfactory than breaking the cycle of violence or vengeance once and for all.
It is certainly legitimate to argue that “turning the other cheek” or freely par-
doning offenses is a better means of managing affairs and establishing lasting
peace than is a strict accounting through criminal prosecution.  The pardoning
of offenses may be the best means of healing the deepest wounds.  It may pro-
vide a new sort of precedent for dealing with old hatreds.24
D.  The Truth Commission Alternative
Prosecution may not be the only means of securing most of the benefits de-
tailed above.  Analysts have, however, been drawn to it because it is the way
things have “always” been done.  As previously remarked, the prosecutorial
approach was the one employed at the end of World War II to deal with Nazi
and Japanese war criminals.  The Nuremberg trials established a precedent that
has served as the “model” since the 1940s.  Most efforts to address serious hu-
man rights violations have been measured against that model ever since.  Nur-
emberg was, however, an unusual case.  The Nazis had been utterly defeated.
They had unconditionally surrendered.  Their society was in ruins and in need
of reconstruction from the ground up.25  The victors included a number of na-
tions that had, in preceding decades, had significant experience with “show tri-
als”26 or deep-seated cultural allegiance to the trial format.  It may not be inap-
propriate to point out that these circumstances are unlikely to obtain in a broad
range of modern cases and that this casts doubt on the universality of the Nur-
emberg paradigm.
The alternative to the criminal trial that has been used with remarkable fre-
quency by emergent democracies is the truth commission.  Commissions have
been charged by almost twenty societies with the mission of gathering as com-
plete as possible a factual record about predecessor regime violations of human
rights with the objective of recording and, in most cases, publicizing prior
                                                          
24. Stephen Marks stresses the point that “Cambodian Buddhism teaches reconciliation in a way
that does not necessarily require justice or retribution,” in explaining why Cambodians may not sup-
port prosecution with respect to the grave crimes of the Khmer Rouge.  Marks, supra note 17, at 38.
25. See Zalaquett, supra note 16, at 1428.
26. On the Soviet predilection for show trials, see ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR
(1968).
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abuses.  While truth commissions have been controversial, they have been a
powerfully attractive alternative to prosecution.
Truth commissions may provide most of the benefits ascribed to the prose-
cutorial approach.  They can insist upon and carry out a thorough examination
of past conduct.  They can identify and hold up to social criticism prior viola-
tions of the rule of law.  In this way, their work can reinforce respect for the
rule of law.  These activities offer a reasonable substitute for prosecution ex-
cept insofar as the credibility of the law requires the imposition of actual pun-
ishment.  While it is difficult to judge whether disclosure and criticism of law-
less conduct create a lasting basis for respect for law in individual cases, it is
reasonable to anticipate that public shaming and emphatic declarations of prin-
ciple will generally advance the rule of law.27 Moreover, forbearance may en-
hance the appearance of fairness and break cycles of vengeance.
Truth commissions can serve even more effectively than trials to educate
the citizenry to the nature and extent of prior wrongdoing.  Since they are not
limited to the individualized facts of a set of prosecutions, they can marshal and
disseminate all the relevant facts about an oppressive regime.  The record a
truth commission can develop is the most powerful tool available to inoculate a
society against dictatorial methods.28  Moreover, since a commission is not nec-
essarily designed to convict anyone, its reports may make a strong claim to im-
partiality—an especially telling point in responding to revisionists intent upon
attacking democratic foundations.
Truth commissions are at least as effective a tool for identifying victims and
establishing a predicate for compensation as trials.  The latitude allowed a
commission to pursue the whole story may, in fact, make it a superior vehicle
for this purpose.29  Prosecution is designed to concentrate on the accused’s acts.
The victim may be important, but his or her suffering is not the central concern
of proceedings.  Truth commissions can make such issues their main concern
and, indeed, may even be structured to enhance the therapeutic benefit of testi-
fying.30
The truth commission’s one real shortcoming is that it cannot match prose-
cutions with respect to the fulfillment of the important policy goals regarding
punishment.  Truth commissions are generally designed to avoid the punish-
ment issue and often barter immunity for information.  The greater the felt
need for punishment, the more seriously the prosecution option must be con-
                                                          
27. See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 95 (“Shame is a rare and precious thing.  ‘You cannot legis-
late repentance,’ Desmond Tutu says, ‘That is where faith comes in.’  The Truth Commission is likely
to inspire more genuine repentance than any other approach yet tried, but it will still reach only a
small portion of apartheid’s criminals and bystanders.”).
28. See Hayner, supra note 8, at 22.
29. The Chilean Commission for Truth and Reconciliation developed a massive record concerning
the fate of 3,000 victims of the Pinochet military regime utilizing input from “social, religious, and po-
litical organizations, as well as the expertise of human rights organizations in Chile and abroad.”
Zalaquett, supra note 16, at 1434.
30. See id. at 1437 (“At first, we did not realize that the very process of seeking the truth was thus
also a patient process of cleansing wounds, one by one.”); Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 90.
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sidered.  Truth commissions are not, however, without any ability to achieve
punishment-like goals.  Their reports can bring shame upon wrongdoers and
lead to their ostracism from society.31 This is far from complete retribution, but
is of some value, especially where prosecution is not a practical possibility.
Commissions may be capable of constructing factual records that generate
social opprobrium of sufficient strength to deter future misconduct, or encour-
age steps that help heal the deep wounds caused by a prior government’s mis-
deeds.  Commission work may produce the sort of “truth” that can “set men
free.”  The threat of disclosure and ostracism may provide a weighty deterrent
(not all that different from the sort of deterrence associated with a free and ro-
bustly inquisitive press).32  Much may turn on the identity of potential malefac-
tors and the importance they attach to good reputation.
E.  Conditions Restricting the Acceptability of Truth Commissions
The decision whether to prosecute the human rights violations of a prede-
cessor regime is often among the hardest an emerging democracy must face.
While there may be valid reasons for choosing factual inquiry rather than
prosecution, the latter is generally superior and should be chosen when possi-
ble.  To avoid creating an easy escape route for governments that desire to
choose political expediency over justice and the obligations of international
law,33 limits on the use of the truth commission alternative ought to be insisted
upon by the international community.  If certain criteria are not met, interna-
tional bodies as well as individual nations should challenge any government’s
decision not to prosecute in cases of serious violations of human rights.
The first of these criteria is that the commission alternative not be adopted
unless it is the embodiment of the will of the majority of the members of a soci-
ety as manifested either by a direct vote of the people or the decision of duly
elected representatives who stand to be judged by the electorate for their deci-
sion.  The efforts of an undemocratic predecessor regime to grant itself immu-
nity should be treated as invalid, as should attempts to thwart prosecutions that
have been ordered by appropriately elected bodies.
The second requirement is that a truth commission should never be ac-
cepted unless it has been established and empowered to investigate prior mis-
deeds fully and effectively.  An appropriate commission is one that is required
to make a record of its findings and publish that record so that all citizens, but
most particularly victims of prior abuse, have unimpeded access to it.  A com-
mission should be accepted as legitimate only if it has sufficient staff and fund-
ing to perform its work,34 as well as complete independence from political inter-
                                                          
31. See supra note 27.
32. See Hayner, supra note 7, at 608-09.
33. This section is predicated upon the proposition that there are treaty obligations, international
agreements, and international law that require nations to address serious human rights violations.  See
Orentlicher, supra note 13; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 20.
34. See Hayner, supra note 7, at 644.
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A third condition on the acceptability of an alternative to prosecution is
that the alternative be coupled with an effective program for the identification
and compensation of the victims of prior abuses.  Those whose lives have been
torn apart by a predecessor regime should, at a minimum, be provided with
compensation for their loss.  Their well-being should not be sacrificed in the in-
terests of national reconciliation.
How might we calculate the overall acceptability of the truth commission
alternative?  Perhaps we should reject such an approach in the following cir-
cumstances:
(1) the commission is not structured to make a thorough in-
quiry or exacerbates delay;
(2) compensation is not paid to victims;
(3) the commission is not the product of democratic decision-
making;
(4) the commission does not yield at least four of the six bene-
fits of prosecution as described above; and
(5) exigent social, economic, or political factors make more
complete compliance impossible.
F.  Human Rights Violations That May Never Be Excused
The international community should declare that there are certain sorts of
human rights violations that will never be tolerated and for which prosecution
is obligatory.  First and foremost among these is genocide.  There is an interna-
tional treaty regarding genocide that imposes the most serious of obligations on
the entire world to prevent or punish this offense.36  That obligation is of such
importance that the interests of a single nation should never be allowed to
thwart prosecution.  The threat of genocide in the modern world is of such
scope that it should never be accepted.
Another set of crimes that should be viewed as beyond reconciliation is that
committed against the citizens of a foreign state.  When a state acts against out-
siders, it should be held to the highest standards.  The Geneva Conventions set
limits that nations should never be allowed to violate.37  The political process
                                                          
35. See Hayner, supra note 8, at 25.
36. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 Dec. 1948, 1
U.N. GAOR Res. 96, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
37. See the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No. I),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention No. II), Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Geneva Convention No. III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (Geneva Convention No. IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 28; Arts. 50, 51, 130, 147, and Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, Art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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internal to any nation is not adequate to protect foreign nationals from serious
violations of their human rights.  It is simply too easy to disregard the claims of
those who do not belong to the community.
The final question is whether and when prosecution should not be under-
taken in response to crimes of a lesser but still extremely serious magnitude.  In
a world regularly confronted by the very worst of crimes, it is important to
maintain a sense of proportionality.  In the past, the world community virtually
never acted to police even the most vicious of crimes committed by regimes
against their own citizens.  Although change is already “in the air,” as demon-
strated by events in Rwanda and Bosnia, actually establishing a new and effec-
tive international policing mechanism will be a major undertaking requiring
great skill and tenacity.  Concerned nations should choose their goals carefully
and pursue an international response only with respect to the worst offenses.
To try to do more by responding to a larger range of serious human rights vio-
lations is a strategy doomed to failure because of the absence of international
consensus, a resultant lack of political will, and a serious shortage of prosecuto-
rial resources.  If the very worst cases are pursued, however, there is a chance
that a new set of precedents, establishing a new tradition, may be forged.  This
is likely to occur only if states stay the course, which, in turn, is to be expected
only if the prosecutions they pursue indubitably justify such a commitment.  By
concentrating on an international response to such events as the Rwandan and
Yugoslav slaughters, we may create the foundation for a new legal order.  One
that can, by increments, be extended.  Historically, this is the way the, at first,
tenuous claims of the rule of law have evolved into the firmest strictures in a
number of nations.  Such a strategy is the one most likely to garner wide inter-
national support and positive publicity.
G.  The Implicit Need for an International Tribunal
The existence of crimes that must always be punished, the serious pressures
that lead nations to avoid prosecutions (both in those cases and in cases of
other serious human rights violations), and the establishment of criteria by
which to judge the propriety of the use of truth commissions all implicitly argue
for the creation of an international criminal tribunal.  Such a body is essential if
prosecution of the most heinous crimes is to be guaranteed.  It is vital to have
an alternative forum when the site of the most atrocious criminal conduct is a
society in turmoil and incapable of meting out justice.38  While democratic
states should be expected to act in appropriate ways and while the international
community should generally respect democratically derived decisions, there
will be times when the gravity of the offense or the impropriety of the process
makes international prosecution essential.  To do less may be to thwart the de-
velopment of the rule of law on a global scale.
                                                          
38. See Nino, supra note 7, at 2638-39.
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H.  The Question of Time
In judging the efficacy of any nation’s actions against human rights viola-
tors, the question of timing must be considered.  As a preliminary matter, it
should be noted that with respect to the sorts of abuses that may never be ex-
cused, no national statutes of limitations ought to be recognized.  Those who
have committed genocide, for example, should be subject to prosecution wher-
ever and whenever they are found.  A far more difficult question is how long
nations ought to be given to prosecute crimes that the law requires be pursued.
Major human rights violations cases take a long time to prepare and can be
immensely costly to prosecute.  States must be given latitude to mobilize re-
sources especially when the crimes involved are of great scope or complexity.
Yet a start on prosecution must be made within a reasonable amount of time,
certainly no more than three years.  Moreover, prosecution should be con-
cluded in no more than twice that amount of time (six years).  The international
community needs to articulate benchmark time limits so that triggers are es-
tablished for international action as well as guideposts for successor regimes.
III
CONCLUSION
Criminal prosecution of egregious human rights violations is usually the
wisest course for a successor regime.  There are, however, circumstances in
which an alternative may be superior, either because it preserves democracy,
substantially strengthens democratic institutions, or responds more efficiently
to immediate and pressing social needs.  One of the most attractive alternatives
to prosecution is the truth commission.  Through such a body, past misdeeds
may be disclosed and memorialized.  The work of a truth commission may
serve as the catalyst in promoting social healing and as a significant deterrent to
future misconduct.
Truth commissions, though, are no panacea.  They cannot, as a general rule,
punish malefactors, and they may tempt some societies not to undertake the
work required to bring justice to the polity.  In light of these problems, the
truth commission alternative should be sanctioned only when it reflects the
democratic will, can fully and effectively investigate prior wrongdoing, is cou-
pled with a program of compensation for the victims of wrongdoing, and, most
importantly, does not seek to excuse the gravest sorts of crimes including geno-
cide and sustained assaults on the civilian populations of foreign nations.
